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 Summary  
Analysis of the change of governance in activating labour market policy in Denmark, 
the UK and Germany supports the restructuring thesis advanced in the course of the 
debate on how to classify the change in the welfare state. New objectives, such as ‘the 
promotion of employability’, have been accompanied by a general trend towards a de-
cline in state responsibility for service delivery and a reduction of rights to transfer 
payments. At the same time, however, the state’s responsibility as guarantor in respect 
of rights to social services has increased and the obligation to work has been introduced, 
in conjunction with an increase in reflexive forms of governance. Thus the observed 
restructuring has brought about a change in the nature of both ‘welfare’ and ‘state’.  
Although the outlined trend of changing forms of governance and statehood is to be 
found in all three countries, level and scope of certain instruments and governance 
forms vary strongly, and characterise the emergence of quite different activating poli-
cies, respectively a convergent divergence of welfare state development.  
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Introduction 
In comparative research on the welfare state, the question of whether the social policy 
reforms introduced since the 1980s or 1990s should be regarded as a dismantling, a sta-
bilisation and growth or a restructuring of the welfare state continues to evoke consider-
able controversy. In the present article, we ask, what kind of welfare state development 
can be observed, on the basis of the evolution of activating LMP (labour market policy) 
in Denmark, the UK and Germany since the early or late 1990s. Therefore we focus on 
changes in governance, analysing if new objectives such as the furtherance of employ-
ability or a change in the division of labour between state and private actors have en-
tailed a reduction, an extension of state activity or a severe change in the forms of state 
intervention. The results are supposed to contest the above mentioned controversy and 
to highlight if there is only a change of ‘welfare’ or also of the ‘state’ taking place.  
Furthermore we will see, if the trend of changing forms of governance and statehood is 
to be found in all three countries and if level and scope of certain instruments and gov-
ernance forms are equal.  
8 
1 Literature Review and Theoritical Context 
1.1 Change in the welfare state: some elements of the debate 
In the debate on change in the welfare state the consolidation argument is usually sup-
ported by predominantly quantitative analyses with largely stable (Pierson 1996) or 
rising rates of social expenditure (Castles 2001, Castles 2004). The dismantling argu-
ment, on the other hand, is usually substantiated with data on reductions in benefits 
(Allan/Scruggs 2004, Korpi/Palme 2003). Advocates of the restructuring argument of-
ten combine these two perspectives and point to the maintenance of or even the increase 
in total social expenditures within quantitative analysis while at the same time using 
qualitative analyses to reveal that specific programmes have been dismantled or that 
individual policy areas have been subject to a process of institutional restructuring 
(Bonoli, et al. 2000, Clasen 2005, Obinger/Starke 2008).  
The ‘extreme’ argument of a paradigm shift in the welfare state is usually substantiated 
by pointing to changes in welfare state objectives, benefits and institutions and to the 
associated changes in social rights (Andersen 2005, Cox 1998). Other authors have 
linked these changes observed to a change of state structures, interpreting them, how-
ever, within rather different normative connotations either as a shift towards the ena-
bling state (Gilbert 2002, Gilbert/Gilbert 1989) or – more negatively – to the workfare 
state (Jessop 1995).  
The change within labour market policies towards an activation approach plays a 
prominent role in all of these concepts. Empirical studies in this field are pointing at a 
reduction of transfer payments and the increased importance of active labour market 
measures (Hvinden 2003). This is sometimes linked to an understanding of a change of 
public intervention referring to the increasing conditionality of social rights and the 
introduction of workfare elements as being part of a contract between individual clients 
and labour market administration (Bredgaard/Larsen 2005, Handler 2003, 
Sol/Westerveld 2005). Other studies highlight organisational changes arising out of new 
public management strategies such as the partial privatisation or contracting out of em-
ployment services, but also the reorganisation of public administration  have been ob-
served across many countries (Borghi/van Berkel 2007, Bruttel/Sol 2006, Finn 2005b, 
Finn, et al. 2005).  But the relating of these changes in labour market policies to a trans-
formation of the state towards an ensuring state (Schmid 2004) so far has been con-
ducted only on an explorative basis. Out of a comparative point of view both fundamen-
tal changes as well as the maintenance of regime varieties are confirmed (Barbier 2005, 
Dingeldey 2007, Esping-Andersen 1998, Serrano Pascual 2007a).  
Thus, the debate on welfare state change seems to be closely linked to the so-called ‘de-
pendent variable problem’ in comparative welfare state research, that is to the choice of 
object to be observed and explained (cf. (Clasen/Siegel 2007, Esping-Andersen 
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1990:14, Starke 2006), the  present article wants to contribute to this debate turning the 
spotlight on to a particular aspect of the welfare state, namely the change in governance 
and the development of public responsibilities. As reforms performed in labour market 
policy may mirror broader developments of the change of the welfare state, the present 
analysis wants to give a full and systematic empirical overview to the changing forms of 
governance including both the governance of social rights and the production and coor-
dination of welfare services. The findings will be related to the questions of increasing 
or declining state responsibilities, respectively to the restructuring of the welfare state 
itself and the convergent or divergent development of these changes across different 
welfare state types. In order to develop the respective research design, we must first 
explore the particular relationship of governance and social policy. 
1.2 Governance and social policy: An interpretative Approach 
The notion of governance, which was developed originally by institutional economists, 
has been used and further developed in many different contexts (for a general overview 
see (Kooiman 1999:68, Pierre 2000).  Following Renate Mayntz, governance should be 
used as a generic term denoting ‘all co-existing forms of collective regulation of socie-
tal matters, from those based solely on the state to those based solely on civil society’ 
(Mayntz 2004). Thus governance denotes the structures as well as the processes of regu-
lation and control (Mayntz 2005:15, Pierre/Peters 2000:14).  
In empirical research that has been conducted to date on, governance is widely associ-
ated with change, but interpretations of the changes that have taken place diverge con-
siderably. Some authors have spoken of the “hollowing out of the state” (Rhodes 1994, 
Rhodes 2000), that is of the erosion of the nation state and of its responsibilities and 
decision-making capacities. This is grounded in an increasing internationalisation and 
Europeanisation of policy making as well as in the privatisation of public enterprises 
and utilities due to neo-liberal ideology and new public management theories. Another 
aspect of this process is the assumption that the state is increasingly dominated by self-
organising policy networks (Rhodes 1994). Counter arguments, however, highlight the 
respective processes and the growing importance of networks provoke the opposite re-
actions and institutions, namely a growth of strategic co-ordination and central control 
by the state. This reflects the growing complexity of governance as a process of ‘filling 
in’ rather than ‘hollowing out’ (Taylor 2000). 
Researchers asking for a transformation of the state, confirm that the fabric of the state 
is unravelling, with its central components drifting apart in different directions 
(Zürn/Leibfried 2005). Due to this point of view, however, processes both of interna-
tionalisation and privatisation are understood as being restricted to partial tasks, which 
require complementary functions still being performed by the nation state. Over all 
within processes of privatisation the state must maintain regulatory functions combined 
with a kind of ‘decision of last resort’. This is interpreted both as a change and an in-
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creasing complexity of state functions (Genschel/Zangl 2007:14f). To characterise 
change of governance and the evolving form of statehood the concept of an ‘ensuring 
state’ is used, which was developed by German researchers as an ideal type model 
(Schuppert 2005).  
In order to be able to put the notion of governance to profitable use in a comparative 
analysis of welfare states and social policy, however, further clarification of the typolo-
gising of the various forms of governance and of our understanding of them is required. 
The particular set of problems posed by the governance of social policy have their roots 
in the fact that, contrary to what is implied in many typologies of governance 
(Bevir/Rhodes 2003, Pierre/Peters 2000:14), in social policy there never have been any 
pure regulatory structures; rather a welfare mix (Evers/Olk 1996) has always domi-
nated, although it varies considerably with the type of welfare state regime in place. 
This has been demonstrated effectfully by Esping-Andersen who used the governance 
of welfare as a distinguishing aspect of welfare state types (Esping-Andersen 1990).  
The exercise of functions in social policy is generally based on a separation of tasks and 
cooperation; this in turn depends on a division of responsibilities between the state and 
social actors, with various sub-tasks being allocated to a number of different bodies. In 
order to identify the object of investigation, therefore, we will follow Schuppert (2003: 
335) in making a distinction between responsibility as guarantor, responsibility as fun-
der and responsibility as service provider. Our understanding of governance itself draws 
on an actor-centred interactive concept as developed by (Scharpf 2000) or (Kooiman 
2005 (2003)). Accordingly, a change in governance will be seen either as a shift in the 
division of responsibilities between various actors and/or a change in the mode of inter-
action.  
Within that approach, a number of different public actors are identified, including cen-
tral government, regional authorities, municipalities and independent, intermediate-level 
financial organisations, such as some of the social insurance funds. The private actors 
include collective, market-based actors and third-sector organisations, as well as fami-
lies and individuals. The modes of interaction include the standard ones, such as hierar-
chy, competition and solidarity, as well as co-governance, which denotes, for example, 
the co-production of services by different actors and/or the establishment of networks. 
Hierarchical governance is identified as the central governance modus of the state and 
associated both with steering (political) and control (bureaucracy). Most important is, 
however, that (Kooiman 2005 (2003)) denotes also changes within hierarchical govern-
ance, defined as shifts “from comand to regulation”, “from procuring to enabling“ und 
“from benevolence to activation“. Thus the actor-based interactive approach provides a 
basis for detailed analysis of the changes in country-specific changes concerning the 
mix of governance in labour market policy.  
Furthermore, the governance of the relationship between the welfare state and the indi-
vidual is a fundamental aspect of welfare state policy, but one that is largely absent 
from current typologies of the various forms of governance. According to (Marshall 
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(1949) 1963), the welfare state can be said to grant social rights to the individual. How-
ever, these rights may be withdrawn and may vary in scope. Thus social rights to de-
commodification can be regarded as a form of public intervention mediated by transfer 
payments that offer temporary compensation for social risks and allow individuals to 
subsist without labour market participation. In contrast, aiming at ‘employability’, 
which may be understood as a right to commodification, requires the provision of ser-
vices, which enable the individual to take part in the labour market. In order to be effec-
tive, public regulation has to be combined with forms of cooperation or co-production 
between administrative and individual actors. To ensure the cooperation of the individ-
ual, however, the process of enablement is closely linked to the increased conditionality 
of rights to transfers or to mandatory activation, i.e. enforcement, which must be re-
garded as another standard form of hierarchical intervention.  
The weight each of the various forms of intervention carries is a matter of political 
choice and the various possible combinations of intervention may give rise to a number 
of different types of activating LMP (Dingeldey 2007). Thus an understanding of the 
welfare state can be developed that regulates the particular tension between commodifi-
cation and decommodification – a thinking that first was promoted by leftist and femi-
nist writings (Knijn/Ostner 2002, Lenhardt/Offe 1977). The ongoing reforms then may 
be understood as a re-interpretation of social rights with respect to individuals’ labour 
market participation, and be interpreted – in line with Kooiman - as change within hier-
archical governance.  
Closely linked to the new policy approach is the distinction between first and second-
order social policy (Kaufmann 1998) which, at a sort of meta level, broaches the issue 
of the mode of welfare state intervention itself, thereby pointing to a further aspect of 
the change in governance. First-order social policy is defined as direct, problem-based 
intervention by the welfare state in social circumstances; second-order policy, on the 
other hand, emerges in the wake of the differentiation of the welfare sector or as a prob-
lem arising out of social policy and relates to the governance of the intervention appara-
tus itself. An example is the administrative reorganisation in order to ensure a closer co-
operation between administrations traditionally concentrated on the provision of income 
support, on the one hand, and the provision of placement services and training on the 
other. Additionally, the homogenisation of unemployment support is mentioned as a 
way to adapt unemployment protection to the needs of flexible post industrial labour 
markets (Clasen/Clegg 2006). 
Kaufmann stresses, furthermore, that interventions by the welfare state have increas-
ingly to reflect the conditions determining the effect of the intervention; ultimately, 
those effects cannot be achieved solely through direct intervention, i.e. commands, pro-
hibitions and incentives, but can only influence the behaviour of target groups by con-
trolling the institutional context and/or enabling structures (Kaufmann 1994:31). Thus 
producing a certain behaviour of individuals requires the broad reflection of their living 
conditions and identify possible preferences and needs. The translation of these reflec-
12 
tions may then be implemented only within an holistic approach of policy making, co-
ordinating the regulation of incentives, service provision and infrastructure within la-
bour market policy but also across various policy fields. In an ideal-typical model, the 
goal of employability requires such an enabling structure over all for those with diffi-
culties to access the labour market. Hence, any attempt to ensure the employability, for 
example of women with young children, but also of people with health problems or 
debts requires the coordination of labour market policy with measures of other policy 
fields. The respective processes of cross policy field coordination and re-regulation of 
institutions we will call reflexive governance.  
All together the particularities of governance in social policy, respectively the empirical 
analysis of most recent changes may provide empirical evidence if the changed role for 
the state, is just geared towards a minimal state or one geared to reflexivity and han-
dling complex coordination functions.  
1.3 Research Design  
We will use a most divergent case design analysing labour market policies in Denmark, 
the UK and Germany, each country representing a different type of welfare state and 
gender regime (Esping-Andersen 1990, Sainsbury 1999), in order to show if there is a 
similarity of changes, respectively a convergent development due to activating policies. 
The particular national welfare state development as well as labour market institutions 
and the difference of the setting of existing programmes and forms of governance are 
therefore outlined as the starting point of the reform, in advance to the analysis of 
changes.  
With respect to the presented interpretative approach of governance in social policy the 
following empirical study analyses three dimensions of the governance of activating 
LMP. The first of these is the shift in the balance of responsibilities between the state 
and collective actors with respect to the production of labour market services. The sec-
ond is the changing relationship between the welfare state and the individual with re-
spect to the right to decommodification, enablement and the enforcement of commodifi-
cation. The third concerns the relation of the state to itself, respectively the use of re-
flexive forms of governance, which are identified both as central restructuring processes 
within the public sector, and the process of coordination across policy areas, which is 
exemplified by the promotion of the employability of women with dependent children.  
Finally the findings are summarised and used to give details concerning the combina-
tion of welfare state retrenchment and expansion resulting in a fundamental restructur-
ing of ‘welfare’ and ‘state’. Within that convergent trend, however, ongoing diversities 
may be identified and characterised as varieties of activation.  
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2 Governance of Activation Policies 
2.1 Context and Timing of Labour Market Reforms 
Since the 1990ies quite different international organisations like the OECD (OECD 
1989, OECD 1994) and the European Union (Europäische Kommission 2006) 
(Jacobsson 2004) promoted the change towards an activating LMP. The respective 
strategies were both inspired by neo-liberal thinking and by political normative writings 
of more leftist authors in different countries advocating a transformation of the welfare 
state towards a social investment state (Giddens 1998) or an activating welfare state 
(Bandemer/Hilbert 2001, Blanke/Bandemer 1999). The respective ideas were taken up 
by national governments and translated to social policy strategies that included changes 
of objectives of the welfare state and in benefits as in governance.  
A main distinction between a Keynesian version of active labour market policy and an 
activating approach as ideal types is that the former was aiming at a better matching of 
labour supply and demand, respectively an improvement of labour market structures 
whereas the later promotes an improvement of individuals’ employability, including not 
only an improvement of individuals’ labour market access, but also a modification of 
work attitudes and personal behaviour (Serrano Pascual 2007b). 
Activating LMP was introduced and continued in Denmark, the UK and Germany at 
different times and by different government constellations: The Social Democrat-
dominated government in Denmark elected in 1994 was a pioneer in this regard, intro-
ducing activating LMP as part of its first labour market reform in the same year. Since 
then, there have been further activating reforms in 1995 and 1998. With the more recent 
programme, known as More People in Work, which came into force in 2003, the then 
newly elected conservative government changed the set of policy instruments and pri-
orities. In particular, it sought to restrict or eliminate altogether any opportunities to 
remain out of the labour market while in receipt of benefits (OECD 2003). Further leg-
islation in 2005 (A new chance for all) introduced benefit cuts and even more restrictive 
work requirements for social assistance recipients, mostly migrants and young people. 
But with the Welfare Reform Agreement in 2006 also for unemployment recipients ac-
tivation requirements have become more strict (Andersen/Pedersen 2007). 
In the UK, activating policy began with the introduction of the job seeker’s allowance 
in 1996, when the Conservative Party was still in power. However, the introduction of 
activating LMP was completed under New Labour, which launched the New Deal or 
Welfare to Work Programme in 1998, as high unemployment was already beginning to 
fall. The New Deal was first targeted at the young unemployed (NDYP), the long-term 
unemployed (NDLTU; renamed ND25+ in 2001) and at lone parents (NDLP). Pro-
grammes for partners of the unemployed (NDPU) were introduced in 1999, followed in 
2000 by a programme for the unemployed aged 50 and above (ND 50+) and finally in 
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2001 by one for disabled people (NDDP) (OECD 2002:60). Thus there was a steady 
increase in target groups and changes were made to particular regulations in order to 
establish a more inclusive approach to activation.  
As a consequence of German reunification, it was not the restructuring but the expan-
sion of traditional instruments of active labour market policy, particularly of job crea-
tion schemes, that was on the agenda in the beginning of the 1990s (Heinelt/Weck 
1998). Although unemployment benefit did suffer some cuts, labour market policy did 
not change direction until 1998 with the reform of the Employment Promotion Act, 
which had actually been drawn up under the Kohl government. The incoming SDP-
Green coalition government produced two waves of rather contradictory activating pol-
icy reforms. The Job Aqtiv Act of 2002 was essentially an enabling and preventive in-
strument, which also promoted women’s labour market participation. The Hartz Re-
forms, also called the First to Fourth Law for Modern Services in the Labour Market, 
which came into force between 2003 and 2005, have not only furthered the restructuring 
of the labour administration but also partly withdrawn these measures, facilitated flexi-
ble forms of employment, like marginal part- time jobs, and – most importantly - cut the 
benefits of the long-term unemployed.  
2.2 Shifting Balance of Responsibilities between the Welfare State and 
Collective Welfare Providers 
In this section, we analyse activating labour market reforms in Denmark, the UK and 
Germany, focusing in particular on shifts in the balance of responsibilities among col-
lective actors with respect to different objects of governance, namely regulation (1), 
financing (2) and service provision (3). We start with a brief introduction to the situa-
tion before the reforms.  
As a common development in all three countries, the responsibility for regulation re-
mains within the public sector. The most widespread change of governance is a shift in 
the balance of responsibilities in the delivery of labour market services towards private 
organisations. This trend of contracting out was accompanied both by an increase of 
competition and co-governance. Changes of financial responsibilities in contrast are of  
more indirect nature and importance. 
In Denmark the entire system of labour administration is strongly corporatist, which 
means that the social partners participate in regulatory and decision-making processes at 
all levels of public administration. The benefit system is administered by the trade un-
ions, although public control was introduced in 1969 in order to generalize benefit lev-
els and conditions. The Employment Service (AMS) is subordinated to the Ministry of 
Employment and provides job placement services and active labour market pro-
grammes. Nevertheless, at national as well as regional level, so-called labour market 
councils were called on to give advice to the public administration prior to reforms. 
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Labour market training, which historically in Denmark was aimed primarily at the em-
ployed and was opened up to the unemployed only recently, is regarded as a public task. 
Thus vocational training programmes take place mainly in regional training centres, 
which form part of the public labour market training system (AMU System). The AMU 
is the product of cooperation between the organisations of the social partners and the 
public authorities, operating together within a tightly structured network. 
(1) With the introduction of activating LMP, regulation was decentralised while the 
influence of the social partners increased. Since the 1990s in particular, planning and 
managerial competences have increasingly been devolved to the regional labour market 
councils, including decisions on contracting-out and the design and scope of the tender-
ing rounds. As the social partners are members of these councils, this has undoubtedly 
strengthened their influence. The municipal reform which came into force in 2007 again 
withdrew managerial labour market competencies from the corporatist governed re-
gional labour market councils to the municipalities and is therefore under suspicion to 
have been used to reduce trade union influence (Andersen/Pedersen 2007). 
(2) The social partners have seen a slight rise in their share of the funding of labour 
market policy programmes, particularly with regard to labour market training. Labour 
market policy in Denmark has traditionally been financed by the contributions paid by 
members of the (voluntary) unemployment insurance scheme (about 15-20 % of costs) 
and by taxation. The labour market reforms of 1994 and 1997 introduced a so-called 
labour market contribution (particularly for employees), which was intended to supple-
ment the financing of labour market training. Since 2001, the social partners, or more 
precisely their representatives on the newly established labour market training funding 
council (AUF), have been responsible for raising the funding required for adult training 
courses provided to meet employers’ skill requirements. The AUF may recommend that 
particular programmes should be jointly funded by employers or that participants seek-
ing higher qualifications should pay the fees (OECD 2001). 
(3) The delivery of labour market services still falls largely within the public do-
main, although elements of marketisation have been introduced. In 1990 the public em-
ployment services’ monopoly on placement services was abolished in order to give 
“other actors” an opportunity. The first tendering round in 2003 led to the conclusion of 
contracts with private enterprises (57%), trade unions (25%) and public institutions 
(18%). Thus in 2004 an average of about 30% of the unemployed population were re-
ferred to “other actors”. Furthermore the introduction of a so-called taximeter system 
linked payments to labour market training providers (AMU) to the number of partici-
pants in programmes (OECD 2001).  
In the UK, the labour market administration is part of the national civil service and un-
employment benefits are administered and paid out by local offices. Under Margaret 
Thatcher, the newly constituted Employment Service (ES) was made directly answer-
able to the government in the shape of the Ministry of Education and Employment. This 
removed all powers of codetermination from the social partners. The ES was managed 
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by targets. In accordance with new public management theories, the provision of labour 
market services was privatised. Thus the implementation of labour market training pro-
grammes was delegated to the training and enterprise councils (TECs), a recently estab-
lished, employer-dominated network. The TECs were managed by output-related con-
tracts and allocated budgets. The training programmes themselves were delivered by 
private providers (Dingeldey 1997:250). 
(1) Under New Labour, the trend towards privatisation was maintained, although 
some regulatory responsibilities were returned to the public sector. Because of problems 
with inefficiency and performance, New Labour replaced the TECs with the learning 
and skills councils (LSCs), which are much more accountable and rooted in the public 
sector. The LSCs were made responsible for the distribution of resources for training 
and education beyond initial general education (excluding the universities). The training 
programmes themselves are still delivered by private organisations under contract to the 
LSCs. 
(2) As the funding of unemployment benefits was always mainly tax based, there 
were hardly any changes.  Furthermore, the decrease in the number of unemployed peo-
ple has been offset by the relative stability of the number of recipients of income sup-
port and incapacity benefit for persons of working age, both of which are non-
contributory (Finn, et al. 2005). 
(3) The already high level of marketisation in the provision of services has actually 
increased still further under the Labour government. Private placement services had 
always been allowed in the UK (Konle-Seidl/Walwei 2001). New Labour has privatised 
the implementation of labour market programmes to a considerable degree. About 10 % 
of the New Deal budget is channelled into programmes for particular target groups, 
which are delivered by private organisations. Thus the delivery of programmes for 
young unemployed people has been contracted out in 10 regions. In the year 2000, the 
establishment of 15 employment zones (EZ) (most disadvantaged regions with above-
average unemployment) was accompanied by the privatisation of the provision of all 
employment programmes for the long-term unemployed in these areas. Public providers 
also competed in the tendering, particularly Working Links, a public-private joint ven-
ture between the ES and a private placement organisation, which competed successfully 
in eight cases (Finn/Knuth 2004). 
In Germany, benefits and services for the unemployed are provided within the unem-
ployment insurance system, headed by the Federal Employment Office, now named the 
Federal Employment Agency (BA). The unemployment insurance fund is a self-
governing agency within which the social partners have rights of codetermination. Al-
though contributions and benefits are determined politically, it enjoys considerable 
autonomy when it comes to implementation. Labour market programmes have always 
been delivered by third parties, mostly by non-public, third-sector organisations and – 
to a minor extent – by profit-making organisations. 
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(1) Most recent reforms have reduced the influence of the social partners on the 
regulation of labour market services. Since 2003, tripartite codetermination within  the 
BA is limited to the administrative council, which only has a controlling function, while 
the executive committee is appointed for a limited period only (Konle-Seidl 2003). 
(2) As in the UK, there has been a shift from contributory to non-contributory bene-
fits. As long-term unemployment has increased, so the relative importance of the tax-
funded unemployment assistance, or its UB II replacement, has increased as well. 
(3) Since the public sector’s share in service provision has always been small, the 
trend towards further marketisation has been rather limited. When the public placement 
services’ monopoly was broken at the end of the 1990s, private providers acquired a 5% 
share of total provision (Konle-Seidl 2003). Since 2002, the drive to privatise has inten-
sified but has not proved to be very successful. The introduction of vouchers for private 
placements services led to only about 70,000 successful placements between April 2002 
and June 2004 (Hujer, et al. 2005: 9). In addition, in 2004, the placement of 396,000 
unemployed people was partly and of 239,000 in whole handled by third parties ap-
pointed by the employment agencies (Bundesregierung 2006:125). The so-called Per-
sonalServiceAgencies (PSAs) were created by a tendering procedure and regulated by 
contract in order to use temporary employment as a placement instrument. In 2004, the 
PSAs offered employment to between 27 and 33,000 people, which was very consid-
erably below expectations (Bundesregierung 2006:138). 
The introduction of UB II in 2005 was combined with the creation of customer centres, 
which were supposed to end differences in the treatment of unemployment benefit re-
cipients, on the one hand, and, on the other, those claiming social assistance (adminis-
tered by the municipalities). Recipients of UB I and UB II are still dealt with in differ-
ent offices, as UB II is administered by 434 consortia formed by local PES offices and 
the municipalities (in 69 cases, municipalities took over completely) 
(Kemmerling/Bruttel 2005). Thus municipal responsibility for implementing labour 
market policy has increased. 
Beyond most common trends, the regulation and financing of labour market policy also 
display particular national differences. In Denmark, the retreat of the state has been ac-
companied by a strengthening of the role of the social partners, with regard to both 
regulation and partly financing - the former being a side effect of the decentralisation of 
regulatory responsibilities. This trend, however, has been reversed again only recently. 
In the UK, the provision of services is increasingly dominated by market-based actors, 
but if inefficiencies are considerable, the example of training policy has demonstrated 
that a partial reversion of responsibility away from a network-based structure back to a 
stronger supervision of the public sector is viable. The same seems true for Germany, 
where codetermination within the BA has been curtailed.  
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2.3 The Changing Relationship between the Welfare State and the In-
dividual 
Activating LMP in Denmark, the UK and Germany is here discussed in order to outline 
the changes of social rights as a notion of changing forms of hierarchical governance. 
Thus, the right to decommodification is analysed, with a focus on the generosity and 
duration of transfers for the unemployed (1). Enforcement is analysed by examining the 
use of contracts between the individual and the labour market authorities, the regula-
tions governing the duty to work and/or mandatory activation (2). Finally, the enable-
ment of labour market participation as a right to commodification will be discussed by 
examining the development of training measures (3).  
The data presented below confirm that, in all three countries, entitlement to social bene-
fits has been restricted through cuts in the level and/or duration of unemployment bene-
fits. This reduction in decommodification has been accompanied by the introduction of 
contracts between the employment service and individual clients, increasing enforce-
ment of labour market participation, some form of mandatory activation and increasing 
control and sanctions. Furthermore, public intervention in the form of social enable-
ment, and further (vocational) training was expanded, advancing also forms of co-
production and cooperation. The only exception is the decline in further vocational 
training in Germany.  
In Denmark the high level of labour market participation that existed before the re-
forms, has been maintained and in some cases increased (activity rate of nearly 80.1 %, 
employment rate of 76.9 % and unemployment rate of only 4.0 % in 2006). In certain 
target groups, particularly women with children (2006: 76.5 %) and older workers, la-
bour market participation has risen significantly (OECD 2007a:46), while part-time 
rates for women were declining until recently (25.6 % in 2006) (OECD 2007b:246). 
This good labour market performance has been accompanied by an activating LMP that 
emphasises social enablement, but also increased enforcement while the level of de-
commodification has been cut only selectively. 
(1) The compensation rate of unemployment benefit has remained unchanged at the 
fairly generous level of 90% of the former wage. However, combined with a rather low 
income ceiling, unemployment benefit in fact functions almost as a flat-rate benefit 
(relatively lower compensation rates for higher income); between 1994 and 1999 the 
duration of unemployment benefit was reduced in stages from eight to four years 
(Andersen/Pedersen 2007, Torfing 1999). 
(2) Since 2002 any ‘reasonable’ job offer must be accepted from the first day of 
unemployment. During the initial period of entitlement to unemployment benefit, 
known as the benefit period, claimants are offered ‘activation measures’, i.e. opportuni-
ties to re-enter the labour market. Since 2006 after 4 weeks of unemployment an inter-
view with the insurance fund has to be attained. If, after nine months unemployment 
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(six months for those under 30), no job has been found, a so-called activation period 
starts, during which claimants have the right and duty to take part in education or job 
training. This is followed up by a new activating programme whenever a person is “out 
of touch with the labour market” for more than six months (OECD 2003:182f). Follow-
ing the introduction of individual action plans in 1994, a contract between unemployed 
individuals and their personal advisers in the employment service must be set up no 
later than the time at which an unemployed individual receives his or her first offer of a 
place on an activation programme.  
(3) Since 1995, between 10,000 and 37,000 unemployed people have taken part each 
year in courses designed to supplement their initial secondary education. Since 2001, an 
apprenticeship for adults attracted at least 5,000 participants per year. Additionally, 
some short labour market training programmes have helped to intensify job search dur-
ing the activation period, and counselling or language courses are being offered to mi-
grant workers (Statistikdatenbanken Denmark 2005). In sum, the great relevance of la-
bour market training is perhaps best demonstrated by the training expenditure rate, 
which remains high at 0.53% of GDP in 2005  (OECD 2007b:271) after decreasing over 
the last years due to changes in the programme structure and a decline in the number of 
unemployed participants.  
Until 2006 in the UK, improved labour market performance (employment rate of 72.5 
%, unemployment rate of 5.4 %) and growing labour market participation (activity rate 
of  76.7 %) had gone hand in hand with a significant decrease in long-term unemploy-
menti (from 45.4% of total unemployment in 1994 to 22.1% in 2006) (OECD 2007b)). 
Furthermore, the increase in the activity rate of lone mothers to over 55% in 2004 may 
possibly be related to activating LMP (HM Treasury 2005) (general employment rate of 
mothers in 2006: 61,7 % (OECD 2007a)). However, these broadly positive develop-
ments conceal the continued existence of  large numbers of poorly paid jobs and high 
levels of (low-hours) part-time employment, particularly among women, whose part 
time rate is 38.8 % which accounts for 77.6 % of all part-time employment (OECD 
2007b). The labour market policy that helped to produce this improved labour market 
performance made considerable use of financial work incentives and enforcement but 
also created social enablement measures.  
(1) A major reform of unemployment benefit had already been implemented in 
1996, when the contributory unemployment benefit and non-contributory income sup-
port for unemployed claimants were replaced by the jobseekers’ allowance (JSA). The 
level of benefit was designed as a flat-rate payment fixed at the level of the lower bene-
fit. The JSA retains a contributory component that lasts only six months (previously 
12), so that 40% of all unemployed individuals claim the means-tested allowance 
(OECD 2006). This has led to a decline in net replacement rates to less than (14 % of 
APW-Income plus housing benefit and family supplements) (OECD 2004:24), which, 
however, provides a comparatively low level of social protection. 
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(2) Since 1996, the actions of the unemployed have been monitored fortnightly by 
officials who have received new discretionary powers, enabling them to issue a job-
seekers’ directive, which requiring individuals to look for jobs in a particular way and 
to take certain steps to ‘improve their employability’. The New Deal was made manda-
tory for the major target groups, namely the young unemployed (after six months of 
unemployment), for those older than 25 (after 18 months) and, since 2002, for the part-
ners of the unemployed as well (< 45 years, no children). For lone parents, the only ob-
ligation is to attend work-focused interviews; participation in programmes is still volun-
tary (as it is for older workers and the disabled) (OECD 2002:60). The New Deal 
scheme starts with a so-called gateway period (up to four months for the young unem-
ployed), in which intensive help and support for job search are offered. This is followed 
by the intensive activity period, during which the various target groups are offered dif-
ferent activation options. In the most highly developed NDYU programmes, these are 
subsidised employment, working on an environmental task force or in the voluntary 
sector or up to twelve months’ free training. In addition, the New Deal introduced indi-
vidual action plans, which are signed when clients enter the gateway period. Non-
compliance or a failure to follow up job offers is sanctioned by benefit withdrawal 
(Clasen/Clegg 2003). 
One particular British strategy that has played an important role is the activation of so-
called workless households (mainly for the low-wage sector and/or in the form of (fe-
male) part-time employment) through in-work benefits. ‘Making work pay’ is the slo-
gan summarising what is in fact the keystone of New Labour’s strategy for reducing 
welfare dependency. It involved a restructuring in 1999 of what was then known as the 
working family tax credit and its subsequent replacement in 2003 by the working tax 
credit (WTC), available to all adults; families with children could, in addition, claim the 
child tax credit (CTC). These reforms were intended to eliminate poverty traps for those 
on benefits and to increase disposable market income through transfer payments that 
vary depending on the number of children in the family (HM Treasury 1998). In 2003/4 
more than 1.6 Million families were claiming WTC and more than 5.5 CTC, spending 
on which amounted to almost £ 15.4, respectively 8.6 million poundsii (HM Revenue & 
Customs Analysis Team 2006), which exaggerates the spending on active LMP meas-
ures. 
(3) Since 1998 in the NDYU about 13.5 % and since 2001 in the ND +25 about 10.4 
% of all unemployed people in the respective groups have been activated (Bivand 
2005). Among the young unemployed about one half chose the training option, but there 
is no information on the quality of the particular programmes. In the case of the long-
term employed aged over 25, it is known that only a minority (about 740 or 7 % out of 
all those being activated between 2001-2004) find places on one-year programmes, such 
as Education and Training Opportunities (ETO), that work towards a recognised voca-
tional qualification. Nearly half of all activated persons attend programmes of much 
shorter duration that aim to improve basic skills (BET) or to update work-related skills 
(IAP) (Bivand 2005). For lone parents, the distribution of training programmes might be 
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expected, at best, to be similar. In view of a partly increasing but comparatively still 
very low level of expenditure on labour market training (0.09 % of GDP) in 2004/5 
(OECD 2007b:276), it can be assumed that training and skill enhancement is still rather 
underdeveloped in the UK.  
The labour market in Germany is characterised in 2006 by a growing but still modest 
activity rate (75.0 %), an also growing but still particularly low employment rate (67.2 
%) and decreasing but still rather high unemployment (10.4 %). The picture is com-
pleted by a fairly high female part-time rate (39.2 %), a significantly low employment 
rate of mothers (54.9 %)  and rising long-term employment (from 44.3 in 1994 to 57.20 
% in 2006) (OECD 2007a, OECD 2007b). This situation may be described as an ongo-
ing labour market crisis, which has been exacerbated by an indecisive labour market 
policy that has combined a decrease in decommodification and an increasingly punitive 
attitude to the long-term unemployed with a general reduction in the provision of train-
ing measures.  
(1) The first wave of benefit cuts was implemented in 1993, before a proper activa-
tion policy was introduced. Since then, the replacement rates for unemployment benefit 
have remained unchanged at 60% for single claimants and at 67% for recipients with 
dependants during the first year of unemployment. Until 2005, means-tested unem-
ployment assistance (UA) paid 53% for singles or 57 % for recipients with dependants 
of former wages to the long-term unemployed. Since then, UA and social assistance 
(SA) have been merged into Unemployment Benefit II (UB II), which is designed as a 
flat-rate payment fixed close to the level of the lower benefit, offering €345 per month 
(no difference between West and East Germany since 2006), plus supplements for chil-
dren and/or adult dependants as well as for housing costs (Bundesministerium für Ar-
beit und Soziales 2006).  
(2) Also in Germany every unemployed person signs a so-called integration agree-
ment, which documents his or her commitment to job-seeking activities since 1998. 
Occupational protection has been removed in stages for all unemployed persons. The 
use of sanctions and/or periods of exclusion from unemployment benefit has increased 
considerably since the mid-1990s. Although resignation remains the main reason for the 
imposition of sanctions (applying in 56.9% of cases in 2004), a refusal to accept reason-
able job is now the reason given in an increasing share of cases (34.7% ) 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2006). 
Under German law, it has always been possible for recipients of SA to be required to 
work for their benefit. The new legislation has maintained the possibility of recruiting 
UB II recipients for work in the general public interest, which means that these work 
opportunities are usually offered by public or third-sector employers. It is up to em-
ployment service advisers to decide whether such compulsory job offers should be 
made, hence, in contrast to Denmark and the UK, mandatory activation has not been 
generalised. In 2005, 6.7% of the long-term unemployed were obliged to take up such 
jobs, although they do not give rise to proper employment relationships, but just provide 
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benefit recipients with an additional income of 1 or 2 Euros per hour (Koch/Walwei 
2005).  
(3) Further vocational training was used extensively in Germany during the reunifi-
cation process, so that the cutbacks in recent years have to some extent to be seen 
against that background. Nevertheless, Hartz I+II undoubtedly marked a change of di-
rection. The general guidelines suggest that the only schemes that should be subsidised 
are those that offer individuals a good chance of finding employment. The regulations 
governing the duration of benefit entitlement, the level of payment and eligibility for 
participation in training schemes were made more restrictive (Kühnlein/Klein 2003). 
These changes have been accompanied by an increase in short-term schemes such as 
labour market training (assessment, general facilities for job applications) and pro-
grammes targeted primarily at the young unemployed (preparation for vocational train-
ing and vocational training). The number of participants in high-quality programmes 
such as further vocational training has decreased rapidly from more than 720,000 in 
1993 to 114,350 in 2005 (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2006). Thus spending on labour 
market training has decreased strongly but in a comparative perspective still remains at 
a middle level of 0.25 % of GDP in 2005 (OECD 2007b:272).  
Most common changes of governance in this dimension are accompanied by still very 
different settings concerning the regulation of decommodification and activation: The 
level and duration of unemployment benefit remained high in Denmark, while it de-
creased for all unemployed to a very low level in the UK and was reformed as a two-tire 
system in Germany, that provides rather low benefits for the long term unemployed. 
The requirement to work and the activation is most compassing in Denmark, restricted 
to steadily increased target groups in the UK and limited to the long term unemployed, 
but implemented only selectively in Germany. This goes along with increased or at least 
maintained “rights” to training opportunities in Denmark while they were decreased in 
Germany and despite small improvements never really developed in the UK. The UK, 
however, is the only country to make extensive use of in-work benefits, that is supple-
mentary benefits conditional on a minimum level of labour market participation. These 
developments go along with still rather divergent labour market performances in the 
different countries although this may not easily be related to the single influence of ac-
tivating LMP, as it is understood that earlier developments and macroeconomic per-
formance may have been of much greater influence to, for example, the level of labour 
market activity or unemployment rates.  
2.4 The changing relation of the state to itself or reflexive forms of gov-
ernance  
In all three countries some kind of mergers of administrative structures and/or benefit 
systems for the different groups of unemployed took place. Furthermore, the mainte-
nance and/or extension of the role of  the state as guarantor and enabler as part of the 
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change in governance has been accompanied by an increased importance of cross policy 
field coordination.  
The reorganisation of state organisations in Denmark reveals a high degree of reflexiv-
ity, since the merging of service areas has been accompanied by a complementary or-
ganisational change at various levels. Responsibility for vocational training was trans-
ferred in 2001 from the Ministry of Labour to the Ministry of Education in order to im-
prove the coherence of initial education and vocational training. Additionally, the com-
petences of the Ministry of Labour and of the Ministry of Social Affairs were merged to 
a large extent when the Ministry for Employment was founded, so that since then acti-
vating labour market policy measures for all people who are unemployed and fit for 
work have been delivered by the same ministry. And since 2007, the job offices for re-
cipients of unemployment benefits and social assistance recipients have been combined 
in one string system of Job Centres at local level. So far, however, the two administra-
tion in the job centres remains separate except in 14 municipalities experimenting with 
a joint administration (Andersen/Pedersen 2007).  
In contrast to these more recent reforms, the coordination of labour market and family 
policy  has been geared to the so-called individual adult worker model since as long ago 
as the 1960s. This means that, with the exception of a tax-free allowance for economi-
cally inactive spouses, virtually all ‘subsidies’ for the single breadwinner model have 
been abolished (Dingeldey 2001). As part of the activation policy, the already extensive 
provision of child care has been increased still further as by 2005, the coverage rates for 
childcare facilities had risen to 61.9% (0-2 years), 95.2% (3-5 years), 80.2% (6-9 years) 
and 10.1% (10-13) (Statistics Denmark various).Not least for this reason, however, the 
coordination of labour market and family policy can be regarded as a successful form of 
reflexive governance, since the various individual measures connect perfectly with each 
other. Even before the end of the parental leave period, offers of child care are made 
that are virtually always full-time places (Dingeldey 2006). Overall, therefore, Denmark 
can be said to have achieved a guarantee of universal employability through forms of 
reflexive governance.  
In the UK, the establishment of the Jobcentre Plus agency between 2002 and 2006 en-
tailed the amalgamation of responsibilities for unemployment and incapacity benefits 
and other welfare benefits with those of the Employment Service (Finn 2005a). The 
new 'one-stop-shops' are now responsible for job placement, the implementation of la-
bour market policy measures and the granting of transfer payments for all benefit claim-
ants of working age. This has resulted in a considerable simplification of the benefits 
structures.  
Increased state intervention in the shape of reflexive forms of governance can also be 
seen in the coordination of labour market policy with the introduction of in-work bene-
fits and a national minimum wage, which represented a new departure in the UK. Men-
tion should also be made in this regard of the expansion of childcare. Given that these 
policies started virtually from zero, considerable efforts have been made. The 3 and 4-
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year olds now all benefit from some form of early education (nursery schools or recep-
tion classes) (DfSSF/DfIUS 2007). In many cases, however, care is provided only for a 
few hours in the morning and/or only for several weeks a year (DfES 2006). Neverthe-
less, the scope and quality of the services provided must be regarded as modest. More-
over, there is a lack of coordination in the detail, for example between the ‘guaranteed’ 
amount of child care (12.5 hours per week) and the minimum working time required to 
be eligible for working tax credits (16 hours per week). Ultimately, this means that (sin-
gle) parents are enabled only to take part-time jobs offering a limited number of hours’ 
work per week.   
In Germany, however, even greater problems have emerged in the implementation of 
reflexive forms of governance. The objective of making the Bundesagentur für Arbeit 
(Federal Labour Agency) responsible for administering the two transfer payments for 
the unemployed (unemployment benefits I and II) and establishing Job Centres as one-
stop-shops for all the unemployed has proved impossible to put into practice (Konle-
Seidl, et al. 2007). Since the necessary reform would have meant removing responsibil-
ity for supporting and placing unemployed welfare recipients from the municipalities, 
the proposal met with considerable resistance from the Länder. The result was a mud-
dled compromise (Knuth 2006b:19). Whereas the contributions-based unemployment 
benefit I is administered by 178 local employment agencies, 356 Arbeitsgemeinschaften 
(ARGEn), joint agencies combining former local PES (government supported temp-
work agencies) and municipal social assistance offices, were set up to administer unem-
ployment benefit II (Konle-Seidl, et al. 2007:38). Moreover, there are 69 so-called Op-
tionskommunen that have chosen to keep the administration of unemployment benefit II 
wholly in municipal hands, eschewing any PES involvement (Knuth 2006b:18). The 
problematic aspect of the new division of labour that has emerged in this way is that the 
‘marshalling yard’ from which unemployed people were dispatched into other benefit 
systems has not, in the final analysis, been abolished but simply modified. Thus 90% of 
those previously in receipt of social assistance were classified as fit for work (Konle-
Seidl, et al. 2007:43), since it was in the municipalities’ interest to transfer as many (po-
tential) recipients of social assistance on to unemployment benefit II  as possible. Con-
versely, it was not in the Federal Employment Agency’s interest to finance employment 
promotion measures for potential long-term unemployed, because if they fail to get a 
job before their entitlement to unemployment benefit I expired, the Agency had both to 
fund the employment promotion measures and pay a further penalty (Aussteuerungsbe-
trag) before the clients were transferred to unemployment benefit II (Konle-Seidl, et al. 
2007:42). In order to avoid this negative incentive, the 6th law of change concerning the 
SGB III changed the respective regulation and now the Federal Employment Agency 
has to finance 50 % of all cost of labour market integration for all recipients of unem-
ployment benefit I (Eingliederungsbeitrag) (Steffens 2009). 
Furthermore, as far as promoting the employability of women with dependent children 
is concerned, it is now clear that the efforts that have been made to put in place a system 
of coordination cutting across different policy areas have resulted in an inconsistent and 
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contradictory incentive structure for such women seeking to enter the labour market 
(Dingeldey 2006). Both the part-time option available under the parental leave scheme 
and the new regulations governing parenting benefit and, above all, the obligation to 
work that applies to both partners in ‘communities of need’ in receipt of unemployment 
benefit II are increasingly aimed at getting both parents and/or spouses or partners into 
employment. For mothers on benefit the general exemption from labour market activa-
tion has been maintained, as long as the children are younger than three years or do not 
have access to childcare places. Thus, the regulation of UB II entails possibilities to 
enforce labour market participation of all other women and mothers with older children 
although if they had been a homemaker during all their lifecourse (Knuth 2006a). 
In contrast, the ‘splitting’ system used to assess married couples’ tax liabilities and the 
obligation to provide support in marriage and other partnerships (e.g. with regard to the 
so-called ‘communities of need’ in receipt of unemployment benefit II) are still geared 
to the single (male) breadwinner model or offer incentives for women with dependent 
children to seek only marginal part-time jobs. Furthermore the employment opportuni-
ties of women with dependent children are particularly restricted by the inadequate pro-
vision of childcare facilities, although they have been extended by recent policy re-
forms. In West Germany in 2005 for the under-3s 9.6 places per 100 children were pro-
vided (compared with 39.8% in East Germany). For the 3-6 age group, the supply is 
much better (85.2% in the West, 95.7% in the East), but only 27% were full-time in 
West Germany compared to 98 % of the places in East Germany in 2005 
(Fuchs/Peucker 2006: 66/34). There were also very few places in after-school clubs, 
particularly in the West (5.0 %, compared with 41.0 % in East Germany) (Spieß, et al. 
2002). 
Thus in Germany, the development of reflexive forms of governance seems to be only 
moderately successful or incomplete over all if the labour market participation of moth-
ers/wifes is concerned as social policy is dominated by conflicting policy models 
(Dingeldey 2006). At best, the infrastructure and the regulation of financial incentives 
combine to ensure that (married) couples and parents participate in the labour market, 
but on unequal terms. 
Thus, comparative analysis confirms a shift in state action towards reflexive forms of 
governance in order to promote employability for all citizens, implemented albeit to 
varying degrees and with varying degrees of success in the various countries.  
3 The restructuring of the welfare state as a change in the nature of 
‘welfare’ and ‘state’ 
In all three countries analysed, the most recent labour market reforms are all under-
pinned by the notion of labour market activation, in which the promotion of employabil-
ity is a major goal. The implementation of that goal goes along with major changes of 
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governance in the three dimensions analysed, namely the relation between the state and 
collective actors as service provider, the state and individual clients and, finally, the 
relation of the state to itself.  
The described development, however, does not follow a single logic of retrenchment or 
retreat of the state. Focusing on the changing forms of governance – as the dependent 
variable for the analysis of welfare state change -  we can confirm the thesis of welfare 
state restructuring as the reduction of state responsibility for the delivery of labour mar-
ket services and the reduction of rights to transfers is combined with an increase of en-
forcement of labour market participation, the extension of public guarantees concerning 
labour market and social services and a move towards reflexive forms of governance in 
order to enable labour market participation of all citizens. All together this confirms a 
change in the function of the state, its changed role as coordinator and within the proper 
forms of hierarchical intervention, affecting strongly the connotation and provision of 
social rights. In this sense, the restructuring of the welfare state towards an activation 
welfare state corroborates the emergence of an ensuring state (Schuppert 2005), indicat-
ing a change in the nature not only of welfare but also of the state itself.  
As the outlined labour market reforms include a change of settings, instruments and 
goals, respectively general ideas, both with respect to the performance of ‘welfare’ and 
‘state’, they even meet the criteria given by Peter Hall  in order to characterise a para-
digm shift (Hall 1993). As this paradigm shift takes place in most different welfare state 
regimes, on a first glance this implies a convergence of welfare state development.  
Beyond the outlined general and convergent changes due to the paradigm shift, how-
ever, differences in initial conditions and in the emphasis given to individual reform 
measures in the different welfare state regimes, supported the maintenance of old or the 
creation of new differences between the various countries in the extent of private ser-
vice provision, the level of individual welfare benefits and the specific focus on social 
capability or financial incentives. Using the outlined categories, on a second glance, we 
can identify the following variations of activating labour market policy. In contrast to 
typologies that highlight enablement and workfare as the main distinguishing elements 
of different activation types (Barbier 2005), the foregoing empirical analysis confirms a 
close link between the strength of enablement and enforcement at the one side, and the 
generosity of benefits and the creation of financial incentives at the other side. 
In the universal welfare state of Denmark, for example, high levels of transfer payments 
have been retained, without increasing financial work incentives significantly. Never-
theless almost universal employability was achieved primarily by expanding the provi-
sion of social services and the extension of enforced activation. This is closely linked to 
extended forms of reflexive governance, respectively long established cross policy field 
coordination in order to support a family model oriented towards the individual adult 
worker model. Furthermore, the privatisation of service delivery is accompanied not 
only by an increase of market-based, but also of third sector provider. 
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Against the background of relatively low benefit levels characterising the liberal wel-
fare state, in the UK reflexive forms of governance were applied most successfully with 
respect to the reform of the labour administration, the integration of benefits and its 
coordination with financial incentives in the tax system. Big progress was made with 
respect to an increase of child care facilities, although its reflexive coordination with 
work requirements still includes major deficits, whereas the improvement of vocational 
training may be regarded as having failed completely. Thus, policies of enablement but 
also enforced activation remain selective and/or restricted to particular target groups. 
The privatisation of service delivery has increased the role of market based actors, and 
the social partners do play a significant role in activation labour market policy, the regu-
lation of the minimum wage being the only exception.  
In the conservative welfare state of Germany changes so far mainly entail a reduction in 
welfare benefits and a promotion of flexible forms of employment. On the background 
of still high unemployment rates until 2005, neither enablement and labour market en-
forcement nor the creation of financial incentives seems to be a dominant strategy. This 
is closely related to a low capability of reflexive governance, which is due both to insti-
tutional restrictions of the federal system and to contradictory family models followed 
through in different policy fields. 
Thus, in a comparative view, most similar trends of development are combined with 
ongoing path dependent trajectories of labour market development that may be charac-
terised as convergent divergence, both in terms of ‘welfare’ and ‘state’ development. 
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i Being unemployed for more than 12 months. 
ii The figures for CTC and WTC are not to be summed as many families claim both credits. 
